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Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and
Fiduciary Administration
by Mary F. Radford*
This Article describes selected cases and significant legislation from
June 1, 2016 to May 31, 2017 that pertain to Georgia fiduciary law and
estate planning.'
I. GEORGIA CASES

A. Year's Support and MaritalAgreements
In Georgia, the surviving spouse of an individual who dies with or
without a will is entitled to petition the probate court for an award of
property from the decedent's estate in the form of "year's support." 2
However, the spouses, either before or during their marriage, can enter
into a contract in which one or both agrees to waive the right to year's

*Marjorie Fine Knowles Professor of Fiduciary Law, Georgia State University College
of Law. Newcomb College of Tulane University (B.A., 1974); Emory University (J.D., 1981).
Reporter, Probate Code Revision Committee, Guardianship Code Revision Committee,
Trust Code Revision Committee of the Fiduciary Section of the State Bar of Georgia. Past
President, American College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC). Author, GEORGIA
GUARDIANSHIPS

AND

CONSERVATORSHIPS

(2017-2018);

REDFEARN:

WILLS

AND

ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA (2017-2018); GEORGIA TRUSTS & TRUSTEES (2017-2018). The
Author is grateful to Georgia State University College of Law graduate Phoebe Edge, and
to current students Caroline Mayson and Phyllis Talley for their research assistance.
1. For an analysis of Wills and Trusts during the prior survey period, see Mary F.
Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships,and FYduciary Administration, Georgia Survey, 68
MERCER L. REV. 321 (2016).
2. O.C.G.A. § 53-3-1 (2017). Year's support, which is available both to the surviving
spouse and to surviving minor children, is defined as "property for their support and
maintenance for the period of 12 months from the date of the decedent's death." O.C.G.A. §
53-3-1(c) (2017). Year's support is discussed in depth in MARY F. RADFORD, REDFEARN:
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA ch. 10 (2017-2018 ed.).
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support. 3 In order for such a contract to be valid, it must be shown that
the spouse who purportedly waived the right had full knowledge of the
right to claim year's support.4 In re Estate of Boyd5 involved an unusual
fact situation, when the husband died within hours of filing his petition
to divorce his wife. During the course of their marriage, the spouses
briefly separated, then reconciled and entered into a post-nuptial
agreement. 6 The agreement provided that if either spouse filed for
divorce, the spouses would only receive certain specified property and
each would "release the other from any further claims that each of them
may have against the other."7 When the husband died and the surviving
wife filed for year's support, the deceased husband's son objected on the
ground that the wife had waived her right in the post-nuptial agreement.
Camden County Superior Court granted summary judgment for the son.8
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, stating that whether the wife
knowingly waived her right to year's support was a question of fact and
there was no evidence in the record the wife had been aware of her right
to claim year's support. 9 This case serves as a reminder of the importance
of documenting the fact that both parties to a marital agreement are fully
aware of the rights they are waiving, such as the right to claim year's
support if the parties are still married when one of them dies. 10
B. Undue Influence and Will Revocation
In Milbourne v. Milbourne,11 the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the
Gwinnett County Probate Court's refusal to grant summary judgment on
the issue of whether the will was the product of undue influence, as well
as the probate court's grant of summary judgment on a will revocation
issue. 12 The testator, Edison Jamal Milbourne (Edison), suffered a
traumatic brain injury in 1999. He was originally cared for at home by
his wife, but was later moved to rehabilitation facilities. Ten years after
his injury (and one month after his worker's compensation claim of

3. See, e.g., Hiers v. Estate of Hiers, 278 Ga. App. 242, 628 S.E.2d 653 (2006)
(upholding prenuptial agreement in which wife agreed to forego any claims against the
husband's estate beyond what he bequeathed to her in his will).
4. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 218 Ga. 617, 619, 129 S.E.2d 862, 864 (1963).
5. 340 Ga. App. 744, 798 S.E.2d 330 (2017).
6. Id. at 744-45, 798 S.E.2d at 331.
7. Id. at 745 n.2, 798 S.E.2d at 331 n.2.
8. Id. at 747-48, 798 S.E.2d at 332.
9. Id. at 749, 798 S.E.2d at 334.
10. See id.
11. 301 Ga. 111, 799 S.E.2d 785 (2017).
12. Id. at 120, 799 S.E.2d at 793.
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$726,000 was finalized), his sister, Vashti, was appointed his guardian. 13
An attorney was appointed to serve as his conservator.1 4 Vashti decided
to move Edison out of the facility, and asked the conservator to pay
approximately $300,000 so she could buy a three or four-bedroom home
for them (in which her daughter and husband would also live), $27,000
to furnish the home, and money to buy a Cadillac Escalade (even though
Edison could not drive). Vashti also asked to be paid $30,000 in advance
for her services as caregiver.15
The probate court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to investigate
the demands.1 6 The GAL tried to explain to Vashti that Edison's projected
life span (about twenty-six years) did not dictate lavish expenditures. The
GAL reported Vashti repeatedly told Edison that people were going to
put him in "one of those homes" and (in the GAL's opinion) Vashti
induced and fed his fear of being in a nursing home. Vashti also told the
GAL, "everybody else had gotten paid and it was her turn to get paid."17
The GAL also opined that Vashti hindered Edison's relationship with his
daughter, Janay, with whom he wanted to reestablish ties. When Janay
called, Vashti would not let her speak to him. Further, Vashti called the
police when Janay visited her father on his birthday. The GAL considered
trying to have Vashti removed as Edison's guardian, but did not because
Edison was "emotionally dependent" on Vashti.18
Soon after Vashti was appointed as his guardian, Edison decided he
wanted to create a will. Vashti testified that the conservator refused to
have a will created. However, the conservator testified a draft was in fact
created, but he was told by Vashti that she had found another lawyer.
Vashti drove Edison to see this other lawyer between two and five times.
She filled out the information sheet at the beginning of the first visit.
13. Id. at 112, 799 S.E.2d at 788. A guardian for an adult will be appointed by the
probate court to handle the adult's personal matters upon a finding that "the adult lacks
sufficient capacity to make or communicate significant responsible decisions concerning his
or her health or safety." O.C.G.A. § 29-4-1 (2017).
14. Milbourne, 301 Ga. at 113, 799 S.E.2d at 788. Attorney John Tomlinson was
appointed to serve as Edison's conservator. Id. A conservator is appointed by the probate
court to handle an adult's property and financial matters upon a finding that "the adult
lacks sufficient capacity to make or communicate significant responsible decisions
concerning the management of his or her property." O.C.G.A. § 29-5-1 (2017).
15. Milbourne, 301 Ga. at 112, 799 S.E.2d at 788.
16. Id. 'The court in its discretion may at any time appoint a guardian ad litem to
represent the interests of a minor, a proposed ward, or a ward in proceedings relating to
the guardianship or conservatorship of that individual." O.C.G.A. § 29-9-2(a) (2017). For a
discussion of guardians ad litem, see IARY F. RADFORD, GEORGIA GUARDIANSHIP AND
CONSERVATORSHIP § 9:2 (2017-18).
17. Milbourne, 301 Ga. at 113, 799 S.E.2d at 788.
18. Id. at 112-13, 799 S.E.2d at 788.
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According to the lawyer's testimony, Vashti remained present during at
least one of the meetings and met separately with the lawyer at other
times. Vashti paid the lawyer's bills. Edison signed a will in January
2013 (the January will) that devised his property to Vashti with the
exception of $50,000 bequests to both Janay and Vashti's daughter,
Tiffany. In that will, Janay would take Edison's estate if Vashti
predeceased him. Later that year, Edison signed a new will (the October
will) that devised all of his property to Vashti, with Tiffany to take should
Vashti predecease him.19
After Edison died, a jury found the October will was the product of
undue influence and also was improperly executed. Following this trial,
Tiffany sought to have the January will admitted to probate. Janay filed
a caveat claiming undue influence, lack of testamentary capacity, fraud,
and the fact that the will had been revoked. The probate court granted
summary judgment to Tiffany on all grounds except the ground of undue
influence. Tiffany appealed that ruling and Janay appealed the summary
judgment on the revocation issue. 20
On appeal, the supreme court addressed both the undue influence
issue and the revocation issue. 21 The court began its discussion of the
undue influence with the statement "the question of undue influence is
generally for the factfinder." 22 The court noted that a rebuttable
presumption of undue influence arises when a beneficiary is (1) in a
confidential relationship with the testator; (2) is not a natural object of
the testator's bounty; and (3) participates actively in the planning,
preparation, or execution of the will. 23 The court then pointed out that
while these factors may have been met in this case, the court need not
engage in a burden-shifting analysis because a jury could have found
undue influence even had the rebuttable presumption not been raised. 24
The court also pointed out Janay presented a wide variety of evidence
that could have caused a jury to conclude that undue influence had, in

19. Id. at 113-14, 799 S.E.2d at 788-89.
20. Id. at 114, 799 S.E.2d at 789.
21. The supreme court first determined whether the probate court had properly
considered during the hearing on the January will the GAL's testimony given during the
trial of the October will. The supreme court, after determining neither party's arguments
to be "completely correct," found that the probate court was acting within its discretion in
considering the transcript of the GAL's testimony. Id. at 115, 799 S.E.2d at 789. For a
discussion of undue influence, see RADFORD, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, at
§ 4:8.
22. Milbourne, 301 Ga. at 116, 799 S.E.2d at 790.
23. Id. at 117, 799 S.E.2d at 791.
24. Id.
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fact, occurred. 25 The court, without opining on the truthfulness of the
evidence, stated that the evidence did create a genuine dispute of
material fact. 26 The court noted the evidence raised more than a "mere
suspicion" of undue influence. 27
As to the issue of whether the January will had been revoked, the court
examined Janay's contention that Edison told Vashti he no longer
wanted the January will and that Vashti, as his guardian, was therefore
obliged to destroy the will. 28 A will may be revoked by "any destruction

or obliteration of the will done by the testator with an intent to revoke." 29
The court pointed out, however, that Edison's statement he did not want
the will, in itself, was not a sufficient revocatory act as required by law. 30
The court also noted the appointment of a guardian for a testator does
not provide an exception to the physical act requirement, nor is the
appointment determinative of testamentary capacity. 31 Finally, the court
stated that the conservator, rather than the guardian, is the appropriate
person to act on a ward's estate planning matters, and the guardian
cannot do so independently of the conservator.32
C. Construction of Wills
Anderson v. Anderson33 involves the dispute over the estate of Edwin
B. "Burt" Anderson Jr. between Burt's three children from his first
marriage (Charles, Arthur, and Kimberly Anderson), and Burt's second
wife and widow, Donna Anderson. Burt's estate contained a substantial
amount of real property, including land that his father, Edwin,
bequeathed to him in 1962. Item Six of Edwin's will provided, in
pertinent part: "I give, bequeath and devise to my son .

.

. the land ...

[description follows]. This land [is] to go to the surviving heir or heirs of
[Burt] at his death." 34 In 1998, Burt executed a power of attorney naming
Charles as his agent and giving him, among other things, the power to
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 118, 799 S.E.2d at 792.
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-44 (2017). For a discussion of the revocation of a will by destruction
or obliteration, see RADFORD, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, at § 5:15.
30. Milbourne, 301 Ga. at 119, 799 S.E.2d at 792.
31. Id. at 119-20, 799 S.E.2d at 792.
32. Id. at 120, 799 S.E.2d at 792-93. As discussed in RADFORD, GEORGIA GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 16, at § 5:19, O.C.G.A. §§ 29-5-23(c)(10) and 29-5-36 set forth a procedure
by which a conservator may request court permission to engage in estate planning for a
ward.
33. 299 Ga. 756, 791 S.E.2d 40 (2016).
34. Id. at 756-57, 791 S.E.2d at 41.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

346

[Vol. 69

administer Burt's property holdings. In 2010, Burt's wife died and Burt
subsequently married Donna. On June 20, 2013, six days before Burt's
death, Charles used his power of attorney to convey a substantial amount
of Burt's real property to himself and his siblings.35 This was not the
same property that had been devised to Burt under his father's will. 36
After Burt's death, Donna filed an action to (1) set aside the 2013
conveyances and (2) construe Edwin's will as devising the 1962 land to
Burt in fee simple, thus, placing the land in Burt's estate and preventing
it from passing directly to his children. The Warren County Superior
Court granted Donna's motion for summary judgment on the 2013
conveyances. The trial court construed the will as leaving the land
devised to Burt in Item Six as a life estate with a remainder to Burt's
children at his death. Burt's children appealed the decision relating to
the June conveyances to the Georgia Supreme Court, and Donna filed a
cross-appeal on the issue of the 1962 land. 37
Donna claimed that Charles had no legal right to execute the 2013
deeds conveying the property to himself and his siblings and therefore
breached his fiduciary duty to his father. 38 On appeal, Burt's children
claimed the trial court erred when it concluded as a matter of law that
Charles breached his fiduciary duty to his father. The supreme court
noted that while there was evidence Charles acted unilaterally when he
executed the deeds, there was also evidence that established Burt
expressly directed Charles to execute the deeds. 39 Viewed in favor of
Charles as the non-moving party, this evidence supported a finding that
Charles acted on his father's express instructions when he executed the
June 2013 conveyances. 40 Thus, there was a genuine issue of disputed
fact regarding Charles' legal authority to execute the conveyances, and
the trial court erroneously disregarded this evidence when it granted
Donna's summary judgment motion. 41
On cross-appeal, Donna challenged the trial court's finding that
Edwin's will left the 1962 land to Burt as a life estate, rather than in fee
simple. 42 The supreme court construed the provisions of Edwin's will by
looking at the four corners of the will "and giving consideration to all of

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

757, 791 S.E.2d at 41.
757 n.1, 791 S.E.2d at 41 n.1.
757, 791 S.E.2d at 41.
757-58, 791 S.E.2d at 42.
758, 791 S.E.2d at 42.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 759, 791 S.E.2d at 42.
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its parts, the paramount objective being to determine his intent."43
Although the first sentence of Item Six of Edwin's will seemed as though
it conveyed to Burt a fee simple interest in the land, the sentence
immediately following provided that the same land should go to Burt's
heir or heirs upon Burt's death.44 The supreme court agreed with the trial
court that the "definite and certain" language of Item Six created a life
estate for Burt with a remainder to Burt's heirs.4 5

D. Beneficiary Designation on Retirement Plans
Regardless of whether an individual executes a will, a variety of
transfers of that individual's property may take place at death that are
governed by laws other than the laws relating to wills and intestacy. The
assets transferred in this way are often referred to as "nonprobate
assets,"4 6 and are typically transferred through a beneficiary designation
made by the owner of an account or insurance policy during the owner's
lifetime. 47 The case Shoenthal v. Shoenthal48 illustrates the importance
of ensuring that beneficiary designations meet all of the formalities
required for the type of account at issue. In this case, Judge Shoenthal,
shortly before his death, sought to change the beneficiary designation on
his DeKalb County Employees Retirement System account so his
daughters, rather than his wife, would share his pension benefits. 49 He
filled out the change-of-beneficiary form that he acquired from the
pension system board (the Board) and designated his two daughters to
share his pension benefits equally. Additionally, he added a handwritten
notation on the form that reflected his wishes. He appended a note with
the Board's address on the form, but did not deliver or mail the form.
Instead, he left it on his desk and continued to work in his office. Two
days later, he entered the hospital and died from surgical complications
within the week. His daughters found the form the following month and

43. Id. (citing Smith v. Ashford, 298 Ga. 390, 393, 782 S.E.2d 251, 253 (2016)).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of
Succession, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1108 (1986).
47. Examples include naming a beneficiary on a life insurance policy or retirement plan
or naming a "payable on death" designee on a bank account. For a discussion of nonprobate
assets, see RADFORD, WILLS & ADMINISTRATION, supra note 2, at § 2:4.
48. 337 Ga. App. 515, 788 S.E.2d 116 (2016).
49. Id. at 516-17, 788 S.E.2d at 117. Before he died, Judge Shoenthal reduced the
beneficiary designation on his employer-provided life insurance policies from 100% for his
wife down to 50% and added his two daughters each as beneficiaries of 25% of the proceeds.
Id. at 516, 788 S.E.2d at 117-18.
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hand-delivered it to the Board, but the Board refused to honor the change
and began making disbursements to the wife.50
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the DeKalb County Superior
Court's judgment that Judge Shoenthal had not effectuated the desired
change because he had not complied with the proper formalities for
changing a beneficiary designation. 51 The court of appeals cited the
applicable pension code, which required "written notice to the pension
board." 52 The court stated that the notice requirement included the

requirement of actual communication with the Board.53 The fact that the
daughters later delivered the form did not meet that requirement
because their father had not expressly directed them to do so and there
was no evidence they were acting as their father's agent. 5
E. Adult GuardianshipJurisdiction
Under Georgia law, the general rule is that a petition for the
appointment of a guardian for an adult is required to be filed in the
probate court of the county in which the proposed ward is domiciled.55
Domicile is not merely a matter of where one resides; rather, the resident
must also have the intent to remain in that place.56 An individual who is
''mentally incompetent" may lack the capacity to form the intent required
to change domicile when he or she moves to another place.5 7
In the case In the Interest of M.P.,58 the Georgia Court of Appeals
examined whether an individual with autism had the capacity to change
his domicile when he moved in with his father in Chatham County,
Georgia.5 9 This individual spent his youth living with his mother in
North Carolina during the school year and lived with his father in
Savannah, Georgia during the summers. When he turned age twenty, he
refused to return to North Carolina and expressed an "adamant" intent
50. Id. at 517, 788 S.E.2d at 118.
51. Id. at 518, 788 S.E.2d at 119.
52. Id. at 517-18, 788 S.E.2d at 118 (citing PENSION CODE OF DEKALB COUNTY § 908).
53. Id. at 519-20, 788 S.E.2d at 119.
54. Id. at 520, 788 S.E.2d at 120.
55. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-10(a) (2017). For a discussion of domicile in the context of
guardianship petitions, see RADFORD, GEORGIA GUARDIANSHIP, supranote 16, at § 1:11. As
discussed in Radford, Wills & Trusts, supra note 1, at 326, in 2016, the Georgia General
Assembly supplemented this general rule when it enacted the Uniform Guardianship and
Conservatorship Proceedings, Jurisdiction Act. The case discussed in this subsection was
decided before the effective date of that act.
56. O.C.G.A. § 19-2-1 (2017).
57. Sorrells v. Sorrells, 247 Ga. 9, 12, 274 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1981).
58. 338 Ga. App. 696, 791 S.E.2d 592 (2016).
59. Id. at 696-97, 791 S.E.2d at 593-94.
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that he wished to reside permanently with his father. The father
petitioned for and was granted guardianship of his son. The mother
claimed the Chatham County Probate Court lacked personal jurisdiction
over the son because he lacked the mental capacity needed to change his
domicile from North Carolina to Savannah.6 0 When the father filed his
guardianship petition, the probate court appointed an individual to act
as "attorney/guardian ad litem" for the son. 61 The attorney/guardian ad
litem reported to the court that, although the son was not capable of
making or communicating significant responsible decisions about his
own health and safety, 62 the son was able to articulate not only his
decision to remain in Savannah, but also the reasons behind that
decision. 63 The court agreed with the probate court that there was
sufficient evidence the mental limitations that justified the imposition of
the guardianship were not such that the son lacked the capacity to
change his domicile. 64 Thus, the probate court properly exercised
jurisdiction over the proceeding.65
The court also affirmed the appointment of the father as the son's
guardian, despite the mother's argument that there was not clear and
convincing evidence the father was a suitable guardian.6 6 The court
pointed out that the clear and convincing evidence standard is applicable
not in the choice of a guardian, but rather in the initial decision of
whether the proposed ward is in fact in need of a guardian.6 7 If it is found
that a guardian is needed, the probate court is then obliged to appoint
the individual who will best serve the interests of the ward as guardian. 68

60. Id. at 696, 791 S.E.2d at 593.
61. Id. at 696, 791 S.E.2d at 594. The description "attorney/guardian ad litem" is
somewhat confusing in this case. Whenever a petition for the guardianship of an adult is
filed in Georgia, that adult is entitled to be represented in the proceeding by an attorney.
O.C.G.A. § 29-4-11(c)(1)(D) (2017). In addition, the court, on its own motion or the motion
of any interested party, may appoint a guardian ad litem to assist in the proceedings.
O.C.G.A. § 29-4-11(c)(4) (2017). The guardian ad litem will not be the same person as the
proposed ward's attorney. O.C.G.A. § 29-9-3 (2017). Thus, it is unclear from the court's
description whether the described individual was acting as the son's attorney or his
guardian ad litem. For a description of the different roles of the attorney and the guardian
ad litem in a guardianship proceeding, see RADFORD, GEORGIA GUARDIANSHIP, supra note
16, at § 4:6.
62. This is the finding that the probate court must make before appointing a guardian
for an adult. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-1(a) (2017).
63. M.P., 338 Ga. App. at 700, 791 S.E.2d at 596.
64. Id. at 702, 791 S.E.2d at 597.
65. Id. at 698, 791 S.E.2d at 594.
66. Id. at 702, 791 S.E.2d at 597.
67. Id.; see O.C.G.A. § 29-4-12(d)(3) (2017).
68. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-12(d)(6) (2017).
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The court noted that in this case, the attorney/guardian ad litem had
agreed that appointment of the father would be in the ward's best
interests and there was no evidence that the father was unfit to serve as
guardian.69

F. Arbitrationof Wrongful Death Claims
In the course of administering an estate, a personal representative and
a decedent's survivors are often faced with the task of pursuing claims
against third parties who may have caused the decedent's death in some
way. For example, this may occur when the decedent was a resident of a
nursing home and the decedent's estate and survivors believe that the
nursing home's negligence caused the decedent's death. The survivors
may bring actions for both pain and suffering and wrongful death.
However, they will often find themselves faced with the fact that the
decedent, or someone acting for her, signed an arbitration agreement
upon admission to the nursing home.
The effect of such an agreement was examined in 2017 in United
Health Services of Georgia, Inc. v. Norton.70 In this case, a patient's agent
signed an arbitration agreement under her general power of attorney
when she entered the nursing home. 7 ' The agreement purported to bind
Lola (the patient), her representatives, "or any person whose claim is
derived through or on behalf of [Lola], including, in addition to those
already listed in this Paragraph, any parent, spouse, child, executor,
administrator, heir or survivor entitled to bring a wrongful death
claim." 72 When Lola died in the nursing home one year later, her spouse
brought a claim against the home for, among other things, wrongful
death. The nursing home sought to compel arbitration, and the trial court
granted its motion. The Stephens County Superior Court found the
arbitration agreement to be binding on all parties for all claims, including
the wrongful death claim, even though this claim was asserted by a party
73
who had not signed the arbitration agreement.
The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed with the spouse that he was not
bound by the arbitration agreement to arbitrate his wrongful death
claim. 74 The court noted the spouse conceded that the arbitration

69. M.P., 338 Ga. App. at 703, 791 S.E.2d at 597-98.
70. 300 Ga. 736, 797 S.E.2d 825 (2017), rev'd, Norton v. United Health Servs. of Ga.,
Inc., 336 Ga. App. 51, 783 S.E.2d 437 (2016).
71. United Health Servs. of Ga., Inc., 300 Ga. at 737, 797 S.E.2d at 826.
72. Id.
73. Norton, 336 Ga. App. at 52, 783 S.E.2d at 439.
74. Id. at 53, 783 S.E.2d at 439.
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agreement would cover claims brought by Lola's estate, 75 but that a
wrongful death claim is a distinct claim that belongs to the survivor and
addresses not the injuries suffered by the decedent prior to death, but the
injuries suffered by the survivor as a result of the decedent's death.76
Noting that arbitration is a matter of consent and contract, the court
refused to compel arbitration because the spouse had never entered into
an arbitration agreement.7 7
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in a
unanimous opinion.78 The supreme court cited Southern Bell Telephone
& Telegraph Co. v. Cassin7 9 and other older Georgia cases for the
proposition that a wrongful death claim is wholly derivative of a
decedent's right of action.80 The supreme court noted these cases
repeatedly indicated that settlements and waivers entered into by a
decedent during his or her lifetime bound the decedent's beneficiaries
even though the beneficiaries did not sign these agreements.81 The
supreme court also pointed out that all defenses that could be made
against the decedent would also bind the beneficiaries. 82 As a duty to
arbitrate has been recognized as a viable affirmative defense, it logically
followed that the decedent's beneficiaries could be compelled to arbitrate
the wrongful death claim.88
II. GEORGIA LEGISLATION

A. GeorgiaPower of Attorney Act
Individuals (principals) are authorized in Georgia to appoint agents to
perform acts relating to the principal's property that the principal could
perform. This appointment is accomplished through a form known as a
"durable financial power of attorney." 84 The principal may appoint an
agent either to perform specific acts for the principal or to perform

75. Id. at 54, 783 S.E.2d at 440.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 55, 783 S.E.2d at 440-41.
78. See United Health Servs. of Ga., Inc., 300 Ga. at 736, 797 S.E.2d at 825.
79. 111 Ga. 575, 36 S.E.2d 881 (1900).
80. United Health Servs. of Ga., Inc., 300 Ga. at 737-38, 797 S.E.2d at 827.
81. Id. at 738, 797 S.E.2d at 827.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 739, 797 S.E.2d at 828.
84. This power of attorney relates solely to the principal's property and should be
distinguished from a power of attorney for health care decisions. Health care powers of
attorney and financial powers of attorney are discussed in depth in RADFORD, GEORGIA
GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 16, at §§ 1:14, 1:22, and 1:23.
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basically all of the acts that are necessary to buy, sell, dispose of, and
otherwise manage the principal's property.8 5
Prior to 2017, Georgia law contained a statutory form for a financial
power of attorney, which was the non-exclusive means of creating a
power of attorney in Georgia.8 6 This form was replaced in 2017 when the
Georgia General Assembly enacted Georgia's version8 7 of the Uniform
Power of Attorney Act (UPOAA)-the Georgia Power of Attorney Act
(GPOAA).88
The GPOAA contains a list of standard powers that may be granted
using the statutory power of attorney form. The breadth of each of these
powers is described in detail in sections 10-6B-43 through 10-6B-56 of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.). 8 The statutory form itself
merely contains a list of descriptive terms of these powers. The powers
relate to:
Real Property.90
Tangible Personal Property.91
Stocks and Bonds.92
Commodities and Options. 93
Banks and Other Financial Institutions. 94
Operation of an Entity or Business.9 5
Insurance and Annuities.9 6

85. Generally, an agent under a power of attorney may not use the power of attorney
to perform acts that are contrary to the principal's wishes nor to benefit the agent herself.
See Bradshaw v. McNeill, 228 Ga. App. 653, 492 S.E.2d 568 (1997); Harris v. Peterson, 318
Ga. App. 382, 734 S.E.2d 93 (2012). However, as noted later in this section, the newlyenacted Georgia Power of Attorney Act (GPOAA) allows an agent to use a power to benefit
herself under certain circumstances.
86. This form appeared in article 7 of chapter 6 of title 10 at former O.C.G.A. § 10-6142 (2010). The newly added O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-6(b) provides that the 2017 GPOAA "shall
not affect a power of attorney executed prior to July 1, 2017." O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-6(b) (2017).
87. Ga. H.R. Bill 221, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 106 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
§§ 10-6B-1-23, 10-6B-40-56, 10-6B-70-71, 10-6B-80-81, 10-6-7, 16-8-10, and 16-5-105).
The bill was signed by Governor on May 8, 2017, and became effective July on 1, 2017. The
GPOAA adds Chapter 6B to Title 10 of the Georgia Code. The GPOAA is discussed at length
in RADFORD, GEORGIA GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 16, at § 1:23.
88. UNIF. POWER OF ATT'Y ACT (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. L. 2006).
89. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-43-56 (2017).
90. See O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-43.
91. See O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-44.
92. See O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-45.
93. See O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-46.
94. See O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-47.
95. See O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-48.
96. See O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-49.
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Estates, Trusts, and Other Beneficial Interests.97
Claims and Litigation. 98
Personal and Family Maintenance. 99
Benefits from Governmental Programs or Civil or Military Service. 100
Retirement Plans. 101

There are certain powers (sometimes referred to as hot powers) 102 that
mandate stricter requirements in that these powers would generally
allow the agent to deplete the principal's estate without receiving any
consideration in return. 103 The principal must expressly grant authority
to an agent under a power of attorney to engage in any of these actions.104
The "hot powers" include the power to:
[make,] (1) create, amend, revoke, or terminate an inter vivos trust; (2)
make a gift; (3) create or change rights of survivorship; (4) create or
change a beneficiary designation; (5) delegate authority granted under
the power of attorney; (6) waive the principal's right to be a beneficiary
of a joint and survivor annuity, including a survivor benefit under a
retirement plan; (7) exercise fiduciary powers that the principal has
authority to delegate; (8) exercise authority over the content of
electronic communications .

.

. ; or (9) disclaim property including a

power of appointment.105
Generally,
an agent that is not an ancestor, spouse, or descendant of the principal,
shall not exercise authority under a power of attorney to create in the
agent, or in an individual to whom the agent owes a legal obligation of

97. See O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-50.
98. See O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-51.
99. See O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-52. This authority allows the agent to provide not only for the
principal, but also the principal's spouse, minor children, adult children under age twentyfive who are pursuing postsecondary education, the principal's or the principal's spouse's
parents (if a pattern of such support had been established), and others who are legally
entitled to be supported by the principal. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-52(a)(1)(A)-(D).
100. See O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-53.
101. See O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-54.
102. See, e.g., Andrew Hook & Lisa Johnson, The Uniform Power of Attorney Act, 45
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 283, 308 (2010).
103. See id.
104. Id.
105. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-40(a) (2017). Unless the power of attorney provides otherwise,
the power to make a gift is further limited in O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-56. See O.C.G.A. § 10-6B56.
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support, an interest in the principal's property, whether by gift, right
06
of survivorship, beneficiary designation, disclaimer, or otherwise.
The GPOAA sets out explicit requirements for the execution of the
power of attorney.1 07 A power of attorney is valid if signed by the principal
and attested by at least one witness and a notary public who is not a
witness. 108 All signatures and attestations must be made in the presence

of all parties. 109
Generally, a power of attorney is effective on the date that it is
executed.1 10 However, the principal may state in the power of attorney
that the power becomes effective on a specific future date "or upon the
occurrence of [an] event or contingency.""il
The GPOAA codifies judicial intervention when there is a suspected
abuse of the power by the agent.1 12 O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-16113 allows the
following people to petition a court to interpret a power of attorney or to
review an agent's conduct: "(1) the principal or the agent; (2) a guardian,
conservator or other fiduciary acting for the principal; (3) a person
authorized to make health care decisions for the principal; (4) the
principal's spouse, parent or descendant; (5) an individual who would
qualify as the principal's presumptive heir[;]" a named beneficiary of the
principal's trust or estate; "(7) a governmental agency having authority
to protect the welfare of the principal welfare; (8) the principal's caregiver
or another person that demonstrates sufficient interest in the principal's
welfare; and (9) a person asked to accept the power of attorney."114
The GPOAA introduces acceptance requirements that are triggered if
5
the power of attorney is a "statutory form power of attorney."" That
term is defined as a power of attorney that follows the form set forth in
the GPOAA, "[a] military power of attorney pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §
1044b," or "a document that substantially reflects the language in the

106. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-40(b) (2017). The power of attorney may expressly override this
general rule. Id.
107. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-5 (2017).
108. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-5(a)(2), (3) (2017).
109. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-5(b) (2017).
110. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-9(a) (2017).
111. Id. A power of attorney that does not become effective until the occurrence of an
event or contingency is referred to as a "conditional" power of attorney. O.C.G.A. § 10-6-6
(2017).
112. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-16 (2017).
113. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-16(a) (2017).
114. Id.
115. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-20 (2017).
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form set forth in Code Section 10-6B-70, so long as it is witnessed as
required by Code Section 10-6B-5."116
In lieu of immediately accepting a power of attorney, a person who is
asked to accept a statutory form power of attorney may request and rely
upon the following without further investigation: an agent's or co-agent's
"certification under penalty of perjury of any factual matter concerning
the principal, [the] agent, or the power of attorney[;] .

.

. [a]n English

translation of the power of attorney[;]" 117 or an attorney's "opinion as to
any matter of law concerning the power of attorney." 118 However, an
English translation or opinion of an attorney must be provided at the
principal's expense unless the request is made more than seven business
days after the power of attorney is presented for acceptance.1 19 If a person
requests a certification, translation, or an opinion of an attorney, the
power of attorney must be accepted within five business days after
receipt of the certification, translation, or opinion.120
Under the GPOAA, a person is not required to accept a statutory form
power of attorney if:
(1) the person is not otherwise required to engage in a transaction with
the principal in the same circumstances; (2) engaging in a transaction
with the agent or the principal in the same circumstances would be
inconsistent with federal law; (3) the person has actual knowledge of
the termination of the agent's authority or of the power of attorney
before exercise of the power; (4) a request for a certification, a
translation, or an opinion of an attorney . . is refused; the person in
good faith believes the power is not valid . . ; or (6) the person makes,
or has actual knowledge that another person has made, a report to
protective services .. . stating a good faith belief that the principal may
be subject to physical or financial abuse, [or] neglect . .. A person that
refuses to accept a power of attorney in violation of [the rules described
above is] subject to a court order mandating acceptance of the power
of attorney; and liability for reasonable attorney's fees and
expenses . . . incurred in any action or proceeding that confirms the
validity of the power. 121

116. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-20(a) (2017).
117. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-19(c), (d) (2017). An optional certification form is included in the
GPOAA. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-71 (2017).
118. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-19(d).
119. Id.
120. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-20(b)(2) (2017).
121. O.C.G.A. § 10-6B-20(c), (d) (2017).
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